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Rising wealth and income inequality has become a matter of increasing public
and professional concern. Trends toward greater inequality have been documented
and discussed by numerous authors [Danziger and Gottschalk, 1993; 1995; Wolfson
and Murphy, 1998]. Although the main focus of this literature is on the worsening
economic condition of the poor and the declining middle class, a frequent subsidiary
focus is on the distribution of capital wealth. The substantial increase in capital wealth
inequality over the last three decades in the United States has been carefully docu-
mented by Wolff [1992; 1994]. In response to the trend, proposals for wealth taxation
and/or taxation of inheritances are being discussed, and in some cases advocated
[Inhaber and Carroll, 1991; Wolff, 1995]. To date, these advocacies have had little
discernible effect on the real world. Indeed, at the time of writing the U.S. Congress
is giving very serious consideration to eliminating estate taxation altogether. Never-
theless, seeds planted in the professional literature may ultimately germinate and
turn the real-world political tide.
The principal perceived problem with a high level of capital wealth inequality is
an equity problem: high inequality in capital wealth ownership generates a high level
of inequality in capital property income, and thereby a higher degree of inequality in
total household income, consumption, utility, and opportunities for personal advance-
ment. These economic inequalities, especially to the extent that they are perceived to
be permanent and impermeable, tend to generate psychological alienation, social dis-
content and political instability. The extent to which capital wealth inequality is per-
ceived as an equity problem is governed largely by the individual’s perception of the
nature of capital wealth and capital income. If capital wealth is regarded principally
as a legitimate return to hard work and/or entrepreneurial risk-taking, then capital
wealth inequality is perceived as less of an equity problem. If, alternatively, capital
property income is regarded principally as an unearned rental income accruing to a
stock of household capital wealth mostly determined by parental socioeconomic sta-
tus, financial inheritance and random chance rather than hard work and/or entrepre-
neurial risk-taking, then it is perceived as more of an equity problem. Numerous
economists have addressed these questions both theoretically and empirically [Yunker,
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Throughout modern intellectual history, socialist critics of capitalism have per-
ceived that aside from inequity, a wide variety of additional social problems, such as
crime, racism, sexism, militarism, alienation, environmental degradation, and pro-
nounced inequality in effective political power, have been aggravated by capitalistic
institutions and conditions. Although some of this criticism may be exaggerated, some
aspects could contain more than a kernel of truth. While the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991 is widely regarded as heralding the end of any serious, organized
movement in the contemporary world toward expanded public ownership of business
enterprise as a cure for the perceived ills of capitalism, many of the problems tradi-
tionally perceived in capitalism by socialists might in principle be ameliorated by
various policies short of public ownership of business enterprise—specifically by poli-
cies to decrease the inequality of capital wealth ownership.
In contributions on a profit-oriented form of market socialism, Roemer [1993;
1994] argues that equalization of political power would tend to reduce the level of
“public bads” (such as pollution) experienced by society, and thereby raise the overall
level of social welfare. Roemer’s argument to this effect remains relevant even if mar-
ket socialism itself (even in the relatively conservative profit-oriented form proposed
by Roemer) is rejected as too radical—because the argument is not that capitalism
per se is responsible for a high level of public bads, but rather that a high level of
capital wealth inequality is responsible for this. Capital wealth inequality may be
reduced by various measures (wealth taxation, inheritance taxation, and so on) short
of the abolition of capitalism and the inauguration of socialism. But the question
remains whether capital wealth inequality does indeed tend to promote pollution and
other “public bads.”
Environmental legislation and cleanup efforts in the advanced industrial nations
has inspired the hypothesis of an “environmental Kuznets curve”, an inverted-U rela-
tionship between environmental pollution and per capita income. The basic idea is
simple and intuitively plausible: environmental cleanliness is a superior good and
once a national economy has completed the transition from low-income to middle-
income status, further economic growth will enable its people to afford a higher level
of environmental cleanliness. Empirical evidence in favor of an environmental Kuznets
curve has been provided by Grossman and Krueger [1995] and Seldon and Song [1994],
among others, at the international level, and by Brooks and Sethi [1997] at the do-
mestic level. Evidence against its generality can be found in Moomaw and Unruh
[1997] and Harbaugh et al. [2000]. Since the economics profession, after more than 50
years of extensive study and discussion, has not reached a strong consensus on the
“distributional Kuznets curve”, it is not surprising that no strong consensus has been
reached during the much shorter period of time during which the environmental
Kuznets curve has been extant. But if we were to accept, for the sake of argument,
both the distributional and environmental Kuznets curves, this would imply that
beyond middle income, nations with higher per capita income display both lower in-
come inequality and lower environmental pollution, which suggests a positive asso-
ciation, possibly causative in nature, between income inequality and environmental
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Of course, it is a statistical truism that associations need not be causative in
nature. And it is easy enough to devise stories where inequality, in and of itself,
tends to improve the quality of the environment. To begin with, it is reasonably plau-
sible that the income elasticity of the preference of the individual household for gen-
eral environmental quality is greater than one. Similarly, it is reasonably plausible
that the distribution of effective political power is roughly proportional to the distri-
bution of income. Given these two assumptions, an increase in inequality, holding
constant the average household income, would lead to more effective environmental
policy and a cleaner environment because the preferences of the richer households
for a clean environment would be more decisive in the determination of social policy.
There is a large environmental economics literature on the relationship between
pollution and per capita income, but few studies examine the effect of inequality, in
and of itself (that is for a given per capita income level), on the amount of pollution.
Since both inequality and pollution are considered by most economists to be “bad” in
a general philosophical sense, it is perhaps not surprising that in the few studies
concerning the issue, there seems to be a tendency toward rationalizing positive cau-
sation between the former and the latter. Boyce and his various collaborators have
developed a political power theory according to which highly unequal economic status
generates highly unequal effective political power, enabling the wealthy minority to
shift the environmental costs of pollution onto the less wealthy majority [Boyce, 1994;
Torras and Boyce, 1998; Boyce et al., 1999]. The Boyce theory is more or less a priori
and lacking in an explicit economic foundation (utility maximization by households
and so on). But more systematic formal models that also indicate a positive relation-
ship between inequality and pollution have been developed by Magnani [2000] and
McAusland [2001].
The Magnani and McAusland models focus on the potential role of income in-
equality, as opposed to wealth inequality, in the generation of environmental degra-
dation. In his book A Future for Socialism [1994], Roemer develops a formal model
with the following result: the higher the household’s share of capital wealth ( ), the
higher will be its preferred level of a profit-enhancing public bad (B) such as pollu-
tion. If this result is correct, and if the distribution of effective political power is pro-
portional to the distribution of capital wealth, then an economy characterized by highly
unequal capital wealth will also be characterized by a high level of all public bads
including pollution.
This article examines the Roemer model conclusion within the context of an al-
ternative model of arguably greater economic content and realism, from which the
result is obtained that the effect of the household’s share of capital wealth on its
preferred level of a public bad is indeterminate in general. However, if specific math-
ematical forms are assumed for the aggregate production function and the household
utility function, some interesting results may be obtained. It is shown that in a Cobb-
Douglas economy (both the aggregate production function and the household utility
function are Cobb-Douglas forms), the household’s share of capital wealth has no
effect at all on its preferred level of the public bad. In a constant elasticity of substitu-
tion (CES) economy (both the aggregate production function and the household util-
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preferred level of the public bad is governed by the numerical values of the elastici-
ties of substitution for the aggregate production function and the household utility
function.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: First, Roemer’s model and
result are presented. Then a generalized economic model of the same problem is
presented. It would appear that even though the basic generalized economic model is
fairly simple, the analysis of this particular problem using the specified model be-
comes algebraically unwieldy. Therefore, an explicit function version of the same model
is developed, using the standard Cobb-Douglas form for both the firm production
function and the household utility function. Within this alternative, it is shown by
explicit solution that household capital wealth has no effect on its preferred level of
the public bad. Since the Cobb-Douglas function is relatively restrictive, additional
analysis is carried out using the CES form. In the CES case, it is not possible to obtain
an explicit solution of the model, but numerical solutions are obtained that indicate
that the effect of the household’s share of capital wealth on its preferred level of the
public bad is governed by the relevant elasticities of substitution. Following the for-
mal analysis, a brief concluding comment is provided.
THE ROEMER MODEL
In an endnote to Chapter 7 of A Future for Socialism [1994, 152-53], Roemer
develops a model in which the comparative statics derivative dB/d  is necessarily
positive. The household utility function is written as follows:
(1) u = y   bB2
where y is income and B is the level of a public bad such as pollution.
This function is maximized with respect to B subject to the budget constraint:
(2) y = w +   
where   is the household’s share of aggregate profits, and both household wage w and
aggregate profits   are functions of B as follows:
(3)  w = w(B) with w'(B) > 0, w''(B) < 0,
(4)    =  (B) with  '(B) > 0,  ''(B) < 0.
The first-order condition for the maximization of u with respect to B is:
(5) w'(B) +   '(B)   2bB = 0.
By implicit differentiation of (5), we have:
(6) dB/d  =   '/(w'' +   ''   2b)109 CAPITAL WEALTH INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC BADS
which by the assumptions above on the w and   functions is necessarily positive.
The result is formally correct but is based on a somewhat thin and atypical eco-
nomic foundation. First, the labor-leisure decision of the household is not incorpo-
rated into the analysis: leisure does not affect the household’s utility and labor does
not affect the household’s income. The model therefore overlooks a fundamental eco-
nomic reality. Second, the explicit mathematical form of the household utility func-
tion utilized in Roemer’s model is nonstandard: not only is it a polynomial, but it is
asymmetric in y and B, being linear positive in the former and quadratic negative in
the latter. Third, the model lacks a production function and an explicit general equi-
librium formulation. It would be of interest, therefore, to ascertain whether the result
generalizes to a larger and more economically standard model.
In fairness to Roemer, it should be emphasized that this model was developed
within a two-page digressive endnote and does not constitute an important compo-
nent of the overall argument of A Future for Socialism. The Magnani and McAusland
models mentioned earlier are far more comprehensive and elaborate than the Roemer
model described in this section, and it might therefore be expected that they would
provide a better basis for comparison with the model developed herein. However,
aside from the fact that the Magnani and McAusland models are concerned with
income inequality per se, as opposed to inequality in capital wealth ownership, it
would be impossible to do justice to their complex expositions within a short space.
Moreover, I believe it is fair to say that despite the considerable technical sophis-
tication displayed in their elaboration, they share some fairly nonstandard funda-
mental assumptions made by Roemer. For example, Magnani utilizes a linear house-
hold utility function in private consumption c and a pure public good Q, representing
environmental quality, implying that diminishing marginal utility applies to neither
good, and that the elasticity of substitution between the two is infinite. In the
McAusland model, effectively no distinction is drawn between production and con-
sumption, in that there is no production side of the model by which the primary factor
supplies of the households are translated into the output levels of the “clean” and
“dirty” commodities. An interesting aspect of both the Magnani and McAusland mod-
els, parenthetically, is that they do not incorporate any assumptions about the higher
income segment of the population having greater political power. It is assumed, rather,
that policies are determined by the preferences of the median voter. For a constant
voter mean income, the higher the level of income inequality, the lower the income of
the median voter. If the income elasticity of preference for a clean environment is
greater than one, then a higher level of inequality will lead to lower environmental
cleanliness by perfectly democratic means.
A GENERAL FUNCTION MODEL
Consider an economy in which there are only two commodities: consumption good
Q and labor L, with respective prices p and w. By Walras’ Law, one arbitrarily se-
lected commodity may be taken as the numeraire. Take this commodity to be Q, and
set p = 1. The consumption good is produced by a single firm through a general neo-
classical production function in which aggregate capital K and aggregate labor L are110 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
standard economic factors of production, and in which the public bad B (for example,
pollution) may also be considered an input into the production process:
(7) Q = F(K, L, B).
The amount of the public bad allowed to the firm is set by government fiat, so that
B is a parameter to the firm. We assume a short-run framework in which the amount
of capital K is fixed. The amount of aggregate labor L is selected by the firm to maxi-
mize gross profit  , defined as the rental return on capital (rK where r is the interest
rate) plus the net operating return on capital [F(K, L, B)   wL   rK]:
(8)   = Q   wL = F(K, L, B)   wL.
Rental return on capital might be defined as interest payments on bonds and other
debt instruments, while the net operating return on capital is dividends plus capital
gains. For purposes of this analysis, the actual breakdown of gross profit into rental
return and net operating return is irrelevant. From the first-order condition for gross
profit maximization:
(9)    / L = FL   w = 0
we have the firm’s demand for aggregate labor:
(10) Ld = Ld(w, K, B).
This is a partial equilibrium reduced-form equation. Substituting this function
into the production function and then the profit function gives the partial equilib-
rium reduced-form equation for P:
(11)   =  (w, K, B)
Turning now to the household sector, each household has a general neoclassical
utility function in income y, leisure h, and net public good G:
(12) u = u(y, h, G),
where
(13) y = wl +   ,
(14) h = 1   l, and
(15) G = 1   B.
Equation (13) is the household budget constraint, equation (14) is the household time
constraint, and equation (15) expresses the good G in terms of the bad B. Maximizing111 CAPITAL WEALTH INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC BADS
utility (12) with respect to household labor l subject to (13), (14) and (15), we obtain
the household’s supply of labor:
(16) l = l(w,  ,  , B).
The households are identical except for the proportion of total financial capital
owned by each household ( ). This means that each household confronts the same w,
  and B. Therefore if we use li to represent both the labor variable and the labor
function for a specific household i, the only argument in the function which needs to
be similarly superscripted is  . Aggregate supply of labor is obtained by summing
over all individual households:
(17) Ls =  li (w,  i,  , B) = Ls(w,  1,  2,...,  n,  , B)
The general equilibrium solution for w is obtained from the equation of the firm’s
aggregate demand for labor (10) to the household sector’s aggregate supply of labor
(17). Using the partial equilibrium reduced form equation for   (11) in the aggregate
labor supply equation (17), we have the market equilibrium condition:
(18) Ld (w, K, B) = Ls(w,  1,  2,...,  n,  , B)
Solving (18) for w, we have the general equilibrium reduced–form equation for w:
(19) w = w(K, B,  1,  2,...,  n)
By substituting forward from this we obtain the general equilibrium reduced form
equation for gross profit  :
(20)   =  (K, B,  1,  2,...,  n)
Now consider the problem of household i’s preferred level of the public bad B. The
general equilibrium reduced-form equations for w and   have to be substituted di-
rectly into the household budget constraint (13), and also indirectly through the effect
of these two variables on household labor supply (16). In addition, these two functions
go indirectly into the time constraint (14) through their effect on household labor
supply.
Making the appropriate substitutions, the utility of household i is expressed as a
function of B and the household capital wealth ownership parameters  1,  2,...,  n.
Using subscript notation for the first partial derivatives of the utility function but full
notation for the other partial derivatives, the first-order condition for the maximiza-
tion of ui with respect to B is as follows:
(21)  ui/ B = ui
y( yi/ B) + ui
h( hi/ B) + ui
G( G/ B)
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(22) yi/ B = [ (wli +  i )]/ B = ( w/ B)li + w[( li/ w)( w/ B) + ( li/  )(  / B)] +  i(  / B),
(23) hi/ B = ( hi/ li)( li/ B) = [ (1 li)]/ li ]( li/ B) = [( li/ w)( w/ B) + ( li/  )(  / B)],
and
(24)  G/ B =  (1   B)/ B = 1.
To obtain the effect of the household capital ownership parameter  i on the pre-
ferred level of the public bad B, we apply implicit differentiation to the first-order
condition:
(25)  B/  i =  ( 2ui/ B  i)/( 2ui/ B2)
By the second-order condition for maximization, the second derivative in the denomi-
nator of the RHS expression is negative, from which we have the standard compara-
tive statics result:
(26) sign( B/  i) = sign( 2ui/ B  i).
Unfortunately, the expression for  2ui/ B  i, if written out fully, is quite compli-
cated. Omitting all terms involving cross second partial derivatives of the utility
function, we have, by differentiation of the first-order condition (21) with respect to
 i:
(27)( 2ui/ B  i) = ui
yy( yi/  i)( yi/ B) + ui
y( 2yi/ B  i) + ui
hh( hi/  i)( hi/ B) + ui
h( 2hi/ B  i)
Not counting the first and second partial derivatives of the utility function, this
expression contains six partials, two of which ( yi/ B and  hi/ B) are given above by
equations (22) and (23) respectively, the first of which contains four component terms
and the second of which contains two component terms. With respect to the remain-
ing four partials, the partial  yi/  i contains four component terms, the partial
 2hi/ B  i contains ten component terms, the partial  hi/  i contains two component
terms, and the partial  2hi/ B  i contains four component terms. If expanded fully,
therefore, equation (27) would contain 34 terms. And recall that this is without tak-
ing into account the cross partial derivatives of the utility function. All of these terms
are composed of partial derivatives of general equilibrium reduced-form relation-
ships, the signs of most of which are indeterminate.
Normally, a large number of terms in a comparative statics derivative suggests
that the sign of the derivative will be indeterminate because there will likely be con-
flicts in sign among the terms. It is shown below in the analysis of the CES economy
that in the general model the comparative statics derivative is indeed indeterminate
since numerical solutions of the CES version of the model show dB/d i positive for
some parameter values and negative for others. Under the circumstances, it is a more
practical approach to develop an explicit function version of the model through the113 CAPITAL WEALTH INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC BADS
same analytical procedure shown above, but using explicit mathematical forms for
the firm production function and the household utility function.
A COBB-DOUGLAS EXPLICIT FUNCTION MODEL
Consider an economy in which n households in the economy supply labor to a
single profit-maximizing firm which produces Q through a Cobb-Douglas production
function in aggregate capital K, aggregate labor L, and a public bad B (for example,
pollution). Each household has a Cobb-Douglas utility function in income y, leisure h,
and net public good G = 1   B. The households are identical except for the proportion
of total financial capital owned by each household ( ).
The specified model is a small-scale general equilibrium model in which the equi-
librium w may now be solved for as an explicit function of the parameters. By means
of forward substitution, an explicit function may then be obtained relating the utility
of each household to the level of public bad B and the household’s ownership param-
eter  . From this function it is observed that the household’s ownership parameter
has no effect on the household’s utility-maximizing level of B.
The firm’s production function relating K, L and B to Q is a Cobb-Douglas form:
(28) Q = K L B .
With this production function, the profit-maximizing aggregate labor demand Ld is:
(29) Ld =  1/(1  )K /(1  )B /(1  )w1/(1  )
Substituting this amount of L into the production function and the profit func-
tion, we have the respective partial equilibrium reduced form equations:
(30) Q =   /(1  )K /(1  )B /(1  )w  /(1  ) and
(31)   = [  /(1  )   1/(1  )]K /(1  )B /(1  )w  /(1  ) .
Another quantity which is useful below is  /w, defined by:
(32)  /w = [  /(1  )   1/(1  )]K /(1  )B /(1  )w 1/(1  ) .
Each household maximizes (with respect to labor l) a Cobb-Douglas utility func-
tion in income y, leisure h and net public good 1   B:
(33) u = y h (1 B) 
subject to the constraints (13) and (14). This gives the household labor supply func-
tion:
(34) l =  /(  +  )   [ /(  +  )](  /w).114 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Recall that households are identical except for financial capital ownership  . This
means that they have the same preference parameters  ,  ,  , and they confront the
same economic parameters (determined at the economy-wide level) w and  . If we
differentiate households with an i superscript, only   and l need be superscripted.
Summing over all n households, the aggregate supply of labor Ls is:
(35) Ls = n /(  +  )   [ /(  +  )]( /w).
Equating aggregate demand for labor (23) to aggregate supply of labor (29) and
using  /w from (26) in the latter, we may solve for equilibrium w as:
(36) w = [(  1/(1  ) +    /(1  ))/n ]1  K B .
By means of substitution of this into the partial equilibrium reduced form equa-
tions for  /w (32) and l (34), we may derive the following general equilibrium reduced
form equations for household income y and leisure h:
(37) y = (r + s )K B 
where
(38) r = [ /(  +  )][(  1/(1  ) +    /(1  ))1  /(n )1  ],
(39) s = [ /(  +  )]{[(n  )(  /(1  )   1/(1  ))1  ]/[  1/(1  ) +    /(1  )] } and
(40) h = a + b ,
where
(41) a =  /(  +  ), and
(42) b = [ /(  +  )]{[(n )(  /(1  )   1/(1  ))]/[  1/(1  ) +    /(1  )]}.
Note that h does not depend on B. Substituting y and h into the utility function
(33), we obtain u as an explicit function of B:
(43) u = (r + s ) K  B  h (1   B)  .
Solving the first-order condition for the maximization of u with respect to B for B,
we have:
(44) B =   /(   +  ).115 CAPITAL WEALTH INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC BADS
The household’s capital income distribution parameter ( ) is seen to have no ef-
fect on the household’s optimal level of the public bad B, indicating that dB/d  = 0. It
may be worth pointing out that the finding that a certain comparative statics deriva-
tive is zero is a positive, nontrivial result. The “no result” finding is that the compara-
tive statics derivative in question has an indeterminate sign: it may be positive or
negative, meaning that it could be zero—but this would be an unlikely special case.
A CES EXPLICIT FUNCTION MODEL
Now consider an economy identical to that studied in the previous section, except
that the firm’s production function and the households’ utility functions are now CES
forms as follows:
(45) Q = K ( L   +  B  ) 1/ 
(46) u = ( y   +  h  ) 1/ (1 B) 
where  f = 1/(1 +  ) is the firm’s elasticity of substitution between L and B and  h =
1/(1 +  ) is the households’ elasticity of substitution between income y and leisure h.
In this case the typical household’s supply of labor is:
(47) l = [1   ( / ) hw  h  ]/[1 + ( / ) hw1  h].
The aggregate supply of labor would look the same as the above except that summa-
tion over all households eliminates the   term (since   i = 1) and replaces 1 with n in
the numerator (the number of households).
In the case of the CES production function, it is not possible to solve explicitly for
firm demand for labor Ld as a function of wage w. However, the firm’s demand for
labor is implicit in its first-order condition for profit-maximization with respect to
labor, which may be written as follows with w on the LHS:
(48) w = K ( L   +  B  ) (1/ ) 1 L   1.
Similarly, the profits function may be written as a function of L:
(49)   = K ( L   +  B  ) 1/    wL.
If we substitute equations (48) and (49) into the aggregate labor supply equiva-
lent of equation (47), we would have one equation in one variable L. Unfortunately,
this equation is not explicitly solvable for L. However, this particular substitution is
indeed convenient for purposes of obtaining numerical solutions of the model by an
iterative process. A small computer program was written to find these solutions. In
addition, the program uses a simple numerical search routine to determine the B
level which maximizes the utility of a given household. For the sake of convenience,
the numerical version of the model consists of only two households. Experimentation
with the program indicated the critical importance of the elasticity of substitution
parameters: the elasticity of substitution within the firm between aggregate labor116 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
and the public bad ( f), and the elasticity of substitution within the household be-
tween income and leisure ( h).
The baseline parameter values for the numerical experiments are as follows: K =
1,   = 0.2,   = .75,   = .25,   = .25,   = .75,   = .25,  1 = .80 (the “rich” household),
 2 = .20 (the “poor” household). A typical numerical result over a range of variation in
the two elasticities of substitution in the model, with additional variation in the capi-
tal wealth ownership parameters, is shown in Table 1. For each combination of values
of the   parameters, each cell of the table shows results on B1
 + B2 and B1/B2 (respec-
tively the total amount of the public bad preferred by the two households combined,
and the ratio of the utility-maximizing level of the public bad for the rich household to
that of the poor household) for a certain combination of  f  and  h . If the ratio B1/B2 is
greater than one, this is a case which supports the Roemer hypothesis that capital-
wealthy households prefer higher levels of the public bad than do less capital-wealthy
households.
The middle cell of each section of the table verifies the analytical result from the
Cobb-Douglas version of the model: when the two elasticities of substitution are both
unity, the household’s capital wealth level has no effect at all on its preferred level of
the public bad. The firm’s elasticity of substitution between L and B has a qualitative
impact on the relative preferences of rich and poor households for the public bad.
When  f is > 1, the rich household prefers a higher level of the public bad than the
poor household. When  f is equal to or very near 1, there is very little effect of house-
hold capital wealth on preferred public bad level. When  f is < 1, the rich household
prefers a lower level of the public bad than does the poor household. The situation is
more straightforward with respect to the household’s elasticity of substitution be-
tween income and leisure ( h): as this parameter increases, both the rich household
and the poor household prefer a lower level of the public bad.
Table 1 also indicates the sensitivity of the result to the existing degree of in-
equality in capital wealth ownership. The less the inequality, the less difference there
is between the preferences of the rich household and the preferences of the poor house-
hold for the public bad, regardless of the elasticities of substitution. Indeed, if there is
perfect equality in capital wealth ( 1 +  2 = .5), then the third section of Table 1 shows
that the preferred level of the public bad is the same for both households. An interest-
ing aspect of Table 1 is the indication that the sum—as opposed to the ratio—of the
amounts of the public bad preferred by the rich household and the poor household is
independent of the distribution of capital wealth.
A substantial amount of sensitivity experimentation with the other parameters
indicated the robustness of the qualitative result shown in Table 1 for the two elastic-
ity of substitution parameters. In the case of some parameter value combinations, no
solution exists to the model, but in all cases in which a solution is obtainable, it is
qualitatively as shown in Table 1. The indication is therefore that Roemer’s conclu-
sion concerning the positive effect of the household’s share of capital wealth on its
preferred level of the public bad is true only if the elasticity of substitution between
aggregate labor and the public bad is high (greater than 1). An empirical estimation117 CAPITAL WEALTH INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC BADS
of this elasticity, if it could be done, would assist our judgment on the likelihood that
a high level of capital wealth inequality tends to increase public bads such as pollution.
CONCLUSION
The theoretical results obtained here do not prove, of course, that the conclusion
derived from Roemer’s model (that wealthy capitalists tend to prefer more public
bads such as pollution than does the rest of the population) is necessarily empirically
incorrect, nor that the conclusion derived from the Cobb-Douglas special case (that
wealthy capitalists are no different from the rest of the population in their prefer-
ences regarding such things as pollution) is necessarily empirically correct. Indeed, a
certain amount of empirical evidence exists to support the proposition that economic
inequality is detrimental to environmental quality. For example, Kahn and Matsusaka
[1997] find that richer districts in the state of California tend to vote against environ-
mental initiatives more so than poorer districts. Nevertheless, the general form speci-
fication of the model suggests that the effect of household capital wealth on the
household’s preferred levels of public bads is a complicated question, and the numeri-
cal results obtained from the CES special case tend to confirm this: numerical analy-
sis of the CES model indicates that the effect can go either way depending on various
TABLE 1
Utility-Maximizing Levels of Public Bad for
High Wealth Household 1 and Low Wealth Household 2
for Various Elasticities of Substitution and Inequality Levels
Case:          1 = .9,          2 = .1
 f = 0.75  f = 1.00  f = 1.25
 h = 0.75 B1+B2 = 0.561 B1+B2 = 0.500 B1+B2 = 0.444
B1/B2 = 0.753 B1/B2 = 0.953 B1/B2 = 1.209
 h = 1.00 B1+B2 = 0.448 B1+B2 = 0.402 B1+B2 = 0.360
B1/B2 = 0.792 B1/B2 = 1.000 B1/B2 = 1.278
 h = 1.25 B1+B2 = 0.347 B1+B2 = 0.313 B1+B2 = 0.283
B1/B2 = 0.846 B1/B2 = 1.073 B1/B2 = 1.378
Case:          1 = .7,          2 = .3
 f = 0.75  f = 1.00  f = 1.25
 h = 0.75 B1+B2 = 0.560 B1+B2 = 0.500 B1+B2 = 0.447
B1/B2 = 0.867 B1/B2 = 0.976 B1/B2 = 1.099
 h = 1.00 B1+B2 = 0.446 B1+B2 = 0.402 B1+B2 = 0.362
B1/B2 = 0.890 B1/B2 = 1.000 B1/B2 = 1.129
 h = 1.25 B1+B2 = 0.346 B1+B2 = 0.314 B1+B2 = 0.285
B1/B2 = 0.922 B1/B2 = 1.039 B1/B = 1.176
Case:          1 = .5,          2 = .5
 f = 0.75  f = 1.00  f = 1.25
 h = 0.75 B1+B2 = 0.560 B1+B2 = 0.500 B1+B2 = 0.448
B1/B2 = 1.000 B1/B2 = 1.000 B1/B2 = 1.000
 h = 1.00 B1+B2 = 0.446 B1+B2 = 0.402 B1+B2 = 0.364
B1/B2 = 1.000 B1/B2 = 1.000 B1/B2 = 1.000
 h = 1.25 B1+B2 = 0.346 B1+B2 = 0.314 B1+B2 = 0.286
B1/B2 = 1.000 B1/B2 = 1.000 B1/B2 = 1.000118 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
parameter values. In general, these results suggest that we would need considerably
more theoretical and empirical information on the question before we would be in a
position to make a relatively strong judgment on it.
The effect of capital wealth inequality on public bads such as environmental pol-
lution is still further complicated by public choice questions. Even if it could be estab-
lished with certainty that wealthy capitalists have a higher preference for public bads
than the rest of the population, this does not necessarily mean that a high level of
capital wealth inequality leads to a higher level of public bads. The question remains
of how much a relatively small minority of wealthy capitalists is able to influence
public choices within a democratic polity. Of course, it is plausible enough that the
distribution of effective political power, even within a nominally highly democratic
polity, is at least roughly proportional to the distribution of wealth and/or income,
and that the preferences of wealthy capitalists would therefore be weighted more
heavily in public decision-making than the preferences of low- and middle-income
people. For example, it is a well-known empirical fact that the wealthy contribute
disproportionately to the campaigns of those running for elective public offices. In
addition, the wealthy probably have disproportionate control over the large corpora-
tions that dominate the contemporary economy. Corporate behavior regarding pol-
luting externalities is a major area of study in environmental economics, [Kohn, 1998;
1999; Harford, 1987; 1997].
But even if the rich do possess disproportionate political influence, it is a compli-
cated issue whether their influence is sufficiently disproportionate to have a material
effect on public policy. The fact that contemporary political democracies are not un-
duly egalitarian in their policies has long been regarded as a paradox requiring expla-
nation, and not all of the explanations that have been offered depend on a high level
of inequality in effective political power. For example, in recent contributions, Roemer
[1998; 1999] has put forward the theory that real-world economic and non-economic
policies are determined simultaneously in a multidimensional bargaining process,
and that equilibrium economic policies are considerably different from what they would
be if their determination were not complicated by non-economic issues.
As for the specific issue of present concern, the effect of capital wealth inequality
on the level of public bads such as pollution, the complexity of the theoretical litera-
ture suggests strongly that this is an empirical issue rather than a theoretical issue,
in the sense that a priori theoretical analysis is unlikely to yield a strong result one
way or the other. The present contribution reinforces this impression. This does not
necessarily mean, however, that theoretical analysis does not have an important role
to play. Theoretical analysis of these problems provides guidance for empirical inves-
tigations by showing what parameters might be important in the determination of
the direction of a certain relationship. The present contribution has shown that John
Roemer’s hypothesis that wealthy capitalists have a higher preference for the public
bad than the rest of the population is more likely to be true to the extent that there is
a high elasticity of substitution between aggregate labor and the public bad in the
production sector of the economy.119 CAPITAL WEALTH INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC BADS
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